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Abstract
Imperfect measurement of uncertainty (deeper uncertainty) in climate sensitivity is in-
troduced in a two-sectoral integrated assessment model (IAM) with endogenous growth,
based on an extension of DICE. The household expresses ambiguity aversion and can
use robust control via a `shadow ambiguity premium' on social carbon cost to identify
robust climate policy feedback rules that work well over a range such as the IPCC cli-
mate sensitivity range (IPCC, 2007a). Ambiguity aversion, in combination with linear
damage, increases carbon cost in a similar way as a low pure rate of time preference.
However, ambiguity aversion in combination with non-linear damage would also make
policy more responsive to changes in climate data observations. Perfect ambiguity aver-
sion results in an in¯nite expected shadow carbon cost and a zero carbon consumption
path. Dynamic programming identi¯es an analytically tractable solution to the IAM.
Keywords: climate policy, carbon cost, robust control, Knightian uncertainty, am-
biguity aversion, integrated assessment
JEL classi¯cation: C73, C61, Q54
1 Introduction
An essential component subject to scienti¯c uncertainty in climate modeling is equilibrium
climate sensitivity, de¯ned as the ratio between a steady-state change in mean atmospheric
temperature ¢Tt and a steady-state change in radiative forcing ¢Rt. The IPCC Executive
Summary IPCC (2007a) stated `The equilibrium climate sensitivity is a measure of the
climate system response to sustained radiative forcing. It is not a projection but is de¯ned
as the global average surface warming following a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations.
It is likely to be in the range 2:0oC to 4:5oC with a best estimate of about 3:0oC, and is very
unlikely to be less than 1:5oC. Values substantially higher than 4:5oC cannot be excluded,
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1but agreement of models with observations is not as good for those values.' Equilibrium
climate sensitivity depends on several underlying physical feedback processes that a®ect
equilibrium mean temperature which are hard to predict. Some of the most uncertain are
the cloud e®ect, water vapor, albedo and vegetation e®ect, see e.g. Harvey (2000) and
Hansen et al. (1984).
An analysis by Roe and Baker (2007) shows that the climate sensitivity probability dis-
tribution is highly sensitive to uncertainties in underlying physical feedback factors. Besides
being skewed with a thicker high-temperature tail that is not likely to be reduced despite
scienti¯c progress in understanding (reducing variance in) underlying feedback factors, the
measurement of the climate sensitivity probability distribution becomes uncertain in mean
as well as variance Roe and Baker (2007). Thus we are facing imperfect measurement of
uncertainty over climate sensitivity outcomes, while expected utility theory and risk aver-
sion require that objective or subjective probabilities can be assigned to each outcome.
Hence, the question is raised whether the traditional concepts of expected utility theory
and risk aversion can explain and capture reasonings behind precautionary principles in
climate change policy. In decision theory the discussion on imperfect measurement of prob-
ability distributions is not new. Already Knight (1971) suggested that for many choices the
assumption of known probability distributions is too strong and therefore distinguished be-
tween `measurable uncertainty' (risk) and `unmeasurable uncertainty', reserving the latter
denotation to include also unknown probabilities. In the literature, unmeasurable uncer-
tainty has been named Knightian uncertainty, deeper uncertainty or simply uncertainty to
distinguish it from risk. Keynes (1921), in his treatise on probability, put forward the ques-
tion whether we should be indi®erent between two scenarios that have equal probabilities,
but the ¯rst scenario has subjective probabilities while the second has objective probabil-
ities. Savage's Sure-Thing principle (Savage, 1954) argued that we could, while Ellsberg's
experiment (Ellsberg, 1961) showed that individuals facing two lotteries, the ¯rst one with
known probabilities and the second one with unknown probabilities, tended to prefer to
bet on outcomes in the ¯rst lottery to bet on outcomes in the second lottery where they
had to rely on subjective probabilities, thus contradicting the Sure-Thing principle. This
behavior was referred to as ambiguity (or uncertainty) aversion as a broader aversion than
risk aversion.
Knightian (or deeper) uncertainty and ambiguity aversion are illustrated in Table 1. Mr
Gentle chooses between rows, deciding whether to buy an umbrella before (Buy Now) a walk
with Mrs Gentle or to wait (Wait-n-See) and buy it only if it starts raining during the walk.
Mr Gentle knows from the weather report that the probability of rain is 0.5. With `Buy
Now' follows a cost of carrying the umbrella as insurance premium, while the `Wait-n-See'
leaves the couple with unmeasurable uncertainty in probability p of ¯nding a shop close
nearby them selling umbrellas when and if it should start raining during the walk. Whether
the certain `Buy Now' choice is preferred or not to the lottery 'Wait-n-See' depends on
Gentle's cost of carrying the umbrella, his risk aversion and his subjective probability p.
Some argue that Gentle always can form subjective probabilities (p;1 ¡ p) also when he
has no knowledge about the city area. However, being new in the city area and lacking
knowledge about p, he may be unwilling to trust or `gamble' with subjective probabilities




Rain No (0.5) Yes (0.5) 1
Shop - Yes (p) No (1-p) 1
Buy Now 0.5 0.5 0 1
Wait-n-See 0.5 0.5p 0.5(1-p) 1
Table 1: Probabilities and of Dry and Wet Outcomes
Gentle may reason as follows: I choose `Buy Now' and thereby avoid exposing myself and
Mrs Gentle to the uncertainty (p;1¡p) in `Wait-n-See', which also involves the irreversible
worst-case outcome that there should be no shops (p = 0) selling umbrellas in the city area.
A reasoning coming to this choice, due to the di±culty of assigning subjective probabilities,
involves aversion not just to risk but also aversion to ambiguity - ambiguity aversion -
and Gentle's reasoning behind the choice demonstrates the Ellsberg's paradox. Unwilling
to form subjective prior, and choosing `Buy Now', Gentle avoids putting into e®ect the
irreversible uncertainty (p;1 ¡ p) that follows `Wait-n-See'.
When it comes to causes of ambiguity aversion, Ellsberg's setup has been repeated
several times, supporting ambiguity aversion. In e.g. Fox and Tversky (1995) subjects
were asked for their willingness to pay, resulting in much higher willingness to pay for the
urn with known probabilities than for the ambiguous urn. However, ambiguity aversion
disappeared in an experiment in which the two urns were evaluated in isolation, suggesting
that the comparison of known vs unknown probabilities matters. Other experiments by e.g.
Curley et al. (1986) showed that fear of negative evaluation when others observe the choice
and may judge the decision-maker for it, increases his ambiguity aversion, which gives it a
connection to how social norms may a®ect policymaking, see also Trautmann et al. (2008).1
Even if we take these factors into account in Gentle's utility, expected utility theory and risk
analysis would still be defective as long as he, due to lack of knowledge, is either unable or
unwilling to assign subjective probabilities to outcomes. Ambiguity aversion is also closely
related to the `precautionary principle' which has been raised in e.g. the Rio Declaration
article 15.2 From a normative standpoint, `Wait-n-See' may be an irresponsible choice by
Gentle as it does not contain the precaution necessary to avoid exposing himself and Mrs
Gentle to the irreversible uncertainty (p;1 ¡ p).
One of the most in°uential ways to model ambiguity aversion is by Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989) who formulated a maximin expected decision criterion, by weakening Savage's
1Frisch and Baron (1988) suggest that issues of blame, responsibility and regret, that observers might
know more than the decision-maker, that a series of ambiguous gambles is more risky than a series of risky
(non-ambiguous) games as possible explanations for ambiguity aversion in situations of ambiguity when
others observe the choice.
2`Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scienti¯c certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-e®ective measures to prevent environmental degradation.' Ulph and
Ulph (1997) have put forward that the bene¯ts of insuring against irreversibility e®ects by actions now
should balanced to the bene¯t of awaiting better scienti¯c information by delaying action.
3Sure-Thing Principle.3 The decision-maker faces a set of probability distributions, and
maximizes expected utility under the belief that the worst-case probability distribution is
true, which in e®ect implies to assign more importance to bad outcomes in the reasoning.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also found empirical evidence that individuals tend to as-
sign more weight to low-probability extreme outcomes than would be implied by expected
utility. The idea behind the maximin decision criterion can be illustrated as viewing Table
1 as a two-player zero-sum game between Gentle, choosing between rows, and `Evil Nature',
as a hypothetical minimizer, choosing between columns minimizing Gentle's utility. Given
Gentle's belief that `Evil Nature' will minimize his outcome by choosing `Rain' and `No
Shops', his expected utility of the certain `Buy Now' choice gets a relatively greater weight,
possibly violating the Sure-Thing principle. Still we could ¯nd a subjective prior ex post
that corresponds to Gentle's choice, but this does not imply that his choice can be explained
by expected utility theory and pure risk aversion, as the reasoning guiding him to the choice
may depend on ambiguity aversion or precautionary principles. The maximin decision cri-
terion, as modeling fears of imperfect measurement of uncertainty, has been applied before
in static models with the general result that it leads to an increase in abatement e®ort, e.g.
Chichilnisky (2000) and Bretteville Froyn (2005), as well as dynamic models using a robust
control approach with applications to e.g. water management Roseta-Palma and Xepa-
padeas (2004), climate change Hennlock (2008b) and biodiversity management Vardas and
Xepapadeas (2008). In climate change policy, the maximin criterion may be used to model
uncertainty aversion and precautionary concerns when the decision-maker has doubts about
imperfect measurements of uncertainty in climate modeling and impact damage outcomes.
However, a climate policy based on the worst imaginable worst-case belief (compare to the
Dismal theorem) would likely be irresponsible when policy actions are connected to large
expected costs of action. Thus, in an IAM we should therefore allow for a `hypothetical
minimizer' to choose over a range of worst-case beliefs corresponding to di®erent degrees of
ambiguity aversion and ¯nd statistically reasonable levels of worst-case beliefs.
1.1 Risk and Uncertainty in IAMs
The simplest way to introduce `risk' in the literature on IAMs has been the so-called
`sensitivity-analysis approach'. Uncertain parameters are varied and values of carbon cost,
optimal policy and outcomes are computed from several runs. This `deterministic approach`
becomes more sophisticated by replacing uncertain input parameter values by samplings
from probability distributions and then obtain policy variables, expected bene¯ts and costs
as probability distributions from which mean and variance can be calculated. Also in de-
terministic models, the probability distributions for policies, costs and bene¯ts can di®er
signi¯cantly from assumed probability distributions for input parameters, but this merely
re°ects that these variables are nonlinear functions of input parameters. Two early exam-
ples based on extensions of DICE (Nordhaus, 1992) resulted in 2 to 4 times higher carbon
cost than the certainty case, re°ecting the bene¯t of reducing risk of high future climate
change costs, see Schauer (1995) and Nordhaus and Popp (1997). Another example mod-
3The Choquet expected utility (CEU) model by Schmeidler (1989) is another example.
4eled catastrophic events by altering the probability distributions of damages as temperature
increases (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). Nordhaus and Popp (1997) also imposed expected
utility maximization and found carbon costs slightly higher than without maximization of
expected utility, re°ecting risk aversion. The Stern Review Stern (2007) performed a study
using PAGE2002 (Hope, 2003) where several parameters are represented as probability dis-
tributions, to explore consequences of e.g. high climate sensitivities of 2:4oC - 5:4oC for
the 5¡95% interval. Clearly, the optimal reductions in CO2 emissions would di®er largely
whether the decision is based on e.g. the lower (2:0oC) or upper (4:5oC) level of the IPCC
likely range, or a level outside the likely range (IPCC, 2007a). My main point (as model
builder) in this paper is to be silent about this level and leave the question unanswered by
letting the household face imperfect measurement of uncertainty over this range rather than
one or another model builder's sometimes ad hoc guesses about its probability distributions
as seen so far in IAM.
When it comes to imperfect measurements of uncertainty in IAM, Hennlock (2008b)
introduced deeper uncertainty in a IAM approach using robust control in climate-economy
modeling. Weitzman independently introduced deeper uncertainty, ¯rst in a draft to his
Review of the Stern Report, and then in an early working paper of Weitzman (2008). Based
on deeper uncertainty, the main results of Hennlock (2008b) and Weitzman (2008) seemed
to tell the same story - uncertain probability distributions can justify large measures taken.
In Hennlock (2008b) results emerged as a `shadow ambiguity premium', inducing an ambi-
guity averse policymaker to take stringent measures (robust carbon pricing). Proposition 6
in Hennlock (2008b) showed that when a policymaker expresses perfect ambiguity aversion
his expected shadow carbon cost becomes in¯nite, and hence, he `backstop acts' by cutting
carbon-generating production to zero. Weitzman's analysis, based on a static linear rela-
tionship between a utility function and a parameter with unknown probability distribution,
showed that with Bayesian learning in a two-period analysis the result may be an in¯nite
expected marginal utility at zero consumption levels (Weitzman, 2008).4 In a model with
multiple regions, Hennlock introduced deeper uncertainty also in regional damage functions
besides climate sensitivity and found an increased stringency from ambiguity aversion as
the worst-case beliefs about local damage become dependent on the worst-case beliefs about
global climate sensitivity.5
In this theoretical paper we apply the IAM approach in Hennlock (2008b) - Analyt-
ical Model Uncertainty in an Integrated Climate-Economy with pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms
(AMUICE-P) - but instead with a utility-maximizing household (AMUICE-C) in a model
based on a two-sectoral extension of the DICE model in continuous time. We distort the
mean of the climate sensitivity probability distribution and end up with a continuum of cli-
mate sensitivity probability distributions over an arbitrarily large (but ¯nite) range so that
they can cover e.g. the IPCC uncertainty range 2:0oC - 4:5oC (or an even greater range)
that our (possibly ambiguity averse) household is willing to imagine (IPCC, 2007a). Given
these multiple mean distorted probability distributions, which are understood as multiple
4Nordhaus (2009) comments on Weitzman (2008) and how the the result can depend on fat tails in the
(posterior) probability distribution.
5M. Hennlock, A Robust Abatement Policy in a Climate Change Policy Model, Department of Economic
and Statistics, University of Gothenburg, 2006, unpublished draft.
5priors that our household can form about climate sensitivity, the household uses robust
control to identify a robust policy design that works well over a range of climate sensitivity
outcomes. The purpose of this ¯rst theoretical paper is not to perform a simulation or
a sensitivity analysis, but to present an IAM and its analytically tractable solution using
dynamic programming and to introduce deeper uncertainty and ambiguity aversion, mod-
eled as maximin decision criterion within robust control, and ¯nally comment on major
consequences in connection to the discussion following the Stern Review on discounting and
the Dismal Theorem. For a straightforward illustration of the approach, we only focus on
uncertainty in equilibrium climate sensitivity in this paper which then has the following
organization: Section 2 presents main features of the household's Ramsey alike problem in
the deterministic problem. Section 3 presents how imperfect measurement of uncertainty
and ambiguity aversion are introduced. Section 4 discusses the major outcomes of the an-
alytical solution which is followed by a summary in section 5. The appendix contains the
analytical solution.
2 The Climate-Economy Model
The AMUICE-C model has its next of kin in DICE when it comes to the way it captures
economic and climatic phenomena. The major choice for the representative household is
whether to consume a ¯nal good, to invest in productive capitals, or to slow global climate
change by abatement and investing in carbon-neutral and (more e±cient) carbon-intensive
technology. Besides the two-sectoral approach, the major di®erence is the introduction
of deeper uncertainty in climate sensitivity as one of the essential components in climate
modeling that is subject to imperfect measurement of uncertainty (Roe and Baker, 2007).
However, in this section we start by de¯ning the deterministic household problem and
introduce uncertainty in section 3.
The representative household problem is described as a Ramsey alike problem as in
DICE but the representative household owns a carbon-intensive production sector and a
carbon-neutral production sector (using a natural capital stock as input) with endogenous
technology growth, inspired by Romer (1990), in both sectors, and a climate model of the
type used in DICE in continuous time. The ¯nal good is composed by carbon-intensive input
consumption Ct and carbon-neutral consumption Gt produced in the carbon-intensive and
the carbon-neutral production sector, respectively. A CES function with constant elasticity
of substitution ¾ and share parameter ! 2 [0;1], describes how the goods Ct and Gt compose


















with elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (constant relative risk aversion) ´ from
consuming the ¯nal good where a high value of ´ is usually interpreted as high risk aversion
or inequality aversion. The household maximizes objective (1) subject to the dynamic
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(Tt ¡ ~ Tt)
¶
dt (9)
The major choice for the representative household is whether to consume the ¯nal good, to
invest in productive capitals, or to slow global climate change by using the following policy
variables: reduce the share of carbon-intensive composition in the ¯nal good by altering
carbon-intensive share in consumption Ct=(Ct + Gt), abatement e®ort qt, research e®ort rt
in carbon-intensive research sector (more output for given emissions levels) and research
e®ort st in carbon-neutral research sector. Sections 2.1 - 2.3 further describe the details of
the dynamic programming problem (1) - (9). A complete list of all 32 model parameters is
found in appendix A.2.
2.1 Carbon-Intensive Production Sector in (2) - (3)
The carbon-intensive production sector is described by the carbon-intensive capital growth
equation (2) and the endogenous carbon-intensive technology growth equation (3). The
carbon-intensive consumption good is produced by using carbon-intensive capital Kt, whose
accumulation (2) is determined by production A¿
KtK®
t L1¡®




t with rt 2 [0;1], consumption of carbon-intensive good Ct and abatement
cost. Applying the polluter-pays-principle, the carbon-intensive sector pays for abatement
7e®ort qt in (2) with a quadratic cost function due to capacity constraints as more e®ort is
employed.
Carbon-intensive technology AK develops endogenously in (3) with research e®ort rt 2
[0;1] and the stock of abatement knowledge AK as inputs in the research process. Thus
a representative household whose research sector has generated many ideas in its history
also has an advantage in generating new ideas relative to research sectors in less developed
regions, see Romer (1990). The `Malthusian constraints' 0 < ¿ < 1 and ÀK > 0 in (2)
`stabilize' the dynamics as restrictions on future technology and capital sets such that
carbon-intensive growth cannot `go on for ever'. The same restriction in (3) also suggests
that it requires more than a doubling researchers in order to double the number of ideas
(as researchers may come up with the same ideas). The implementation of new discoveries
in the production process, implies that some of the old knowledge cannot be used in the
current production process. For example, some of artisans' knowledge before the industrial
revolution was lost. Imperfect substitution of knowledge over time is re°ected by ±K ¸ 0.
2.2 Carbon-Neutral Production Sector in (4) - (5)
Growth equations (4) and (5) describe the dynamics of the carbon-neutral sector. The
carbon-neutral consumption good Gt is produced by using carbon-neutral (environmental
or natural) capital Et whose accumulation follows (4). The ¯rst two terms in (4) describe
a technology-enhanced natural growth function with carrying-capacity ¹ E = (ÀK + ·(1 ¡
st)A
Ã
Et)1=(1¡Á). Carbon-neutral technology AE develops endogenously as in (3) and improves
carbon-neutral capital growth (and raises carrying-capacity), thus counteracting the damage
from temperature increases in (4). The `Malthusian constraints' 0 < Ã < 1 and ÀE > 0 in
(4) put restrictions on future technology and capital sets such that carbon-neutral growth
cannot go on forever.
An overview of climate change impacts is found in IPCC (2001) and IPCC (2007b).
Considered impacts are often on natural capitals; agriculture, forestry, water resources,
loss of dry- and wetland (due to sea-level rise) etc. We let natural capital be damaged
by an `increasing-damage-to-scale' Cobb-Douglas function ©(Tt ¡ T0)E
Á
t in (4) adopted
from Hennlock (2005) and Hennlock (2008a) with © as a climate impact parameter.7 The
`increasing-damage-to-scale' implies that a given temperature increase leads to a greater
total damage (or gain for © < 0) the greater is the natural capital stock. The net carrying-
capacity with climate impact is then:
¹ E =
h
ÀE + · (1 ¡ st)A
Ã
Et ¡ ©(Tt ¡ T0)
i 1
1¡Á (10)
Carbon-neutral technology AEt can then also be seen as adaption technology in (10).
7Solutions are possible also when letting physical capital carry impact of climate change. However,
separating stocks to damaging (physical) capital and damaged (environmental) capital, makes a unique
solution possible corresponding to the veri¯ed value function.
82.3 Climate Modeling in (6) - (9)
Equations (6) - (9) describe a continuous-time modi¯ed version of the climate model used in
DICE.8 Total emissions in the ¯rst term in (6) is proportional to carbon-intensive production
fraction and thus AK increase output for given emissions °ow where ' > 0. The second
term is abatement level ¹qt where ¹ > 0. Net emissions °ow accumulates to the global
atmospheric CO2 stock, Mt where ² > 0 is the marginal atmospheric retention ratio and
­ > 0 the rate of assimilation. The atmospheric CO2 stock, Mt in°uences global mean
atmospheric temperature Tt via the change in radiative forcing Rt (Wm¡2) in (7) which
a®ects the energy balance of the climate system, and hence, the global mean atmospheric
temperature Tt in (8) via the deep ocean temperature ~ Tt in (9).9 The parameter ¸0 is
essential for equilibrium climate sensitivity, ¿1 is the thermal capacity of atmosphere and
upper ocean and ¿3 is the thermal capacity of deep ocean. 1=¿2 is the transfer rate from
the atmosphere and upper ocean layer to the deep ocean layer.10
3 Robust Control in Climate Policy Design
Robust control is a condition of analysis when speci¯cations of the dynamics, in our case
the climate model and climate impacts, are open to doubt by the decision-maker due to im-
perfect measurement of uncertainty. For illustrative purposes we here only introduce deeper
uncertainty in climate sensitivity, though it could also be introduced in climate impacts.11
In temperature equation (8) there are two possible places to introduce uncertainty in prob-
abilities over climate sensitivity outcomes - via the radiative forcing parameter ¸0 in (7)
and via the climate feedback parameter ¸1 re°ecting uncertainty in the underlying physical
processes. Both are conclusive for equilibrium climate sensitivity in (8) and introducing
uncertain probability distributions in both ¸0 and ¸1 resulted in a solution with multiple
solutions.12 For illustrative purposes, we here want a straightforward unique solution and
look at a household that only forms multiple priors about equilibrium climate sensitivity.
8The climate model was originally based on Schneider and Thompson (1981).












where ° is calibrated to ¯t (7). The corresponding change in equilibrium mean temperature (¤0+ ^ ¤0)=(°¤1)
in (8) from M=M0 = 2 can be calibrated to follow (7).
10The geophysical parameter values used in the discrete DICE climate model are ¤0 = 4:1, ¤1 = 1:41,
1=¿1 = 0:226, ¿3=¿2 = 0:44 and 1=¿2 = 0:02 and ­ = 0:0083. For a calibration of these parameters to
continuous form see e.g. Smirnov (2005).
11Knightian uncertainty in both climate sensitivity and local climate impacts was introduced in M.
Hennlock, A Robust Abatement Policy in a Climate Change Policy Model, Department of Economic and
Statistics, University of Gothenburg, 2006 unpublished draft, and resulted in signi¯cantly higher expected
carbon cost for a given degree of ambiguity aversion as expected local damage becomes a function of worst-
case beliefs in both local climate impact and global climate sensitivity.
12M. Hennlock, A Robust Abatement Policy in a Climate Change Policy Model, Department of Economic
and Statistics, University of Gothenburg, 2006, unpublished draft.
9Thus in what follows we let ¸0 capture all uncertainty in equilibrium climate sensitivity,
although its uncertainty also has transitional feedback sources in ¸1 as analyzed by Roe and
Baker (2007), but also their analysis is performed in equilibrium terms. We follow Hennlock
(2008b) and de¯ne the following process:
B0t = ^ B0t +
Z t
0
¤0sds ¤0s 2 [¤0;min;¤0;max] (12)
where d ^ B0 is the increment of the Wiener process ^ B0t on the probability space (¥G;©G;G)
with variance ¾2
v ¸ 0 where f ^ B0t : t ¸ 0g. Moreover, f¤0t : t ¸ 0g is a progressively mea-
surable drift distortion, implying that the probability distribution of B0t itself is distorted
and the probability measure G0 is replaced by another unknown probability measure Q0
on the space (¥G;©G;Q). The sensitivity process ¤0t is then introduced in temperature























(Tt ¡ ~ Tt)dt
¶
and hence, temperature equation (13) follows an analytically tractable Ito process. Since
both mean and variance of drift term ¤0t are uncertain, (12) yields di®erent statistics (pri-
ors) of equilibrium climate sensitivity in (13) where the interval [¤0;min;¤0;max] indicates
the maximum model speci¯cation error, e.g. corresponding to the range of climate sen-
sitivity outcomes that the household is willing to imagine. Setting ¾0 = 0 yields the the
`benchmark model' that the household regards as an approximation to an unknown and
unspeci¯ed global climate system that generates the true data.
3.1 Ambiguity Aversion as a Dynamic Maximin Decision Criterion
Ambiguity aversion violates the Sure-Thing Principle by Savage (1954), which is essential
for ensuring that conditional preferences are well-de¯ned and consistent over time and also
being a basis for Bayesian updating. We assume that a rational decision-maker instead
updates her beliefs to new information by a time consistent rule derived from backward
induction using a dynamic maximin decision criterion adopted from robust control (Hansen
et al., 2001).13 We border to the problem a hypothetical minimizer that resides in the head
of our household making her to think `what if the worst about climate sensitivity turns out
to be true'. We then introduce an aversion to uncertainty with 1=µ0 2 [0;+1] assigning
how much our household listens to her `minimizing voice'. The maximin criterion, with




















e¡½tdt + µ0R(Q0) (14)
13While Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) view ambiguity aversion as a minimization of the set of probability
measures, Hansen et al. (2001) set a robust control problem and let its perturbations be interpreted as
multiple priors in max-min expected utility theory. Epstein and M. (2001) provides another updating
process.
10which can be formulated as a zero-sum di®erential game between the household (maximizer)
and the hypothetical minimizer choosing the worst-case climate sensitivity prior path for
the household. The last term contains a Lagrangian multiplier µ0 and the ¯nite entropy
(Kullback-Leibler distance) R(Q0) as a statistical measure of the distance between the
benchmark climate sensitivity prior and the worst-case climate sensitivity priors, generated
by f¤0sg, in what follows: Recall that the unknown process in (12) will unexpectedly
change the probability distribution of B0t, having probability measure Q0, relative to the
distribution of ^ B0t having measure G0. The Kullback-Leibler distance between probability

















which has the property that Q0 is locally continuous with respect to G0, implying that G0
and Q0 cannot be distinguished with ¯nite data, and hence, probability distributions cannot
be inferred by using current ¯nite climate data. Statistically this mimics the situation that
current climate data from underlying physical processes is not su±cient to predict climate
sensitivity probability distributions with certainty in accordance with Roe and Baker (2007).




























where the quadratic term contains mean distortions ¤0t and the minimization with respect
to ¤0t creates a lower (worst-case) boundary of the value function. The corresponding





t) from the household's expected maximization
would then be robust to priors that the household could imagine within the range [0;¤¤
0t].
Maximizing-minimizing objective (17) subject to14
dK =
h
(ÀK + (1 ¡ rt)A¿
Kt)K®
t ¡ cq2


























































(Tt ¡ ~ Tt)
¶
dt (24)
de¯nes the household's stochastic optimization problem (17) - (24), bordered with the
hypothetical minimizer choosing the household's upper boundary beliefs about climate-
sensitivity mean distortions.
4 An Analytically Tractable Solution
The maximin dynamic programming problem (17) - (24) is solved by forming its Isaacs-
Bellman-Flemming (IBF) equation in (38). Finding an analytically tractable solution to
(38) by `guessing-and-verifying' is tedious and left for appendix A.1. In short, the procedure
goes as follows: Taking the ¯rst-order conditions of (38) and rearranging yield robust policy
feedback rules. In order to identify shadow prices and costs, a value function that solves
the IBF-equation (38) needs to be identi¯ed by a guessing-and-verifying procedure. Once
a value function is veri¯ed that solves (38) it can be di®erentiated with respect to state
variables and so identify the shadow price and cost partial derivatives. An analytically
tractable solution to (17) - (24) is possible by carefully specifying 6 of the 32 parameters
in appendix A.2. and its corresponding value function is identi¯ed in appendix A.1. Since,
the objective function in (17) is time autonomous, any robust policy feedback rule will be
time consistent (Dockner et al., 2000). Moreover, certainty equivalence makes the variance
distortions in (12) irrelevant, thus only mean distortions are relevant. Taking the ¯rst-order






rearranging, yield robust policy feedback rules (25) - (30) where the partial derivatives are





















































The carbon-intensive consumption feedback rule in (25) is determined by the shadow price of
carbon-intensive capital @W=@Kt. The lower the shadow price, the greater is consumption.
The carbon-neutral consumption rule (26) has the same structure but with the instan-
taneous price ¼ > 0. The abatement rule in (27) is determined by the relative price of
shadow carbon price ¡@W=@Mt with respect to carbon-intensive capital @W@Kt (due to
polluter-pays-principle). Since @W=@Mt · 0 abatement will be positive. The research ef-
fort feedback rule in carbon-intensive technology in (28) reduces carbon-intensity in carbon-
intensive sector by greater fuel e±ciency etc. and is determined by the relative shadow price
of carbon-intensive technology with respect to carbon-intensive capital. By symmetry, the
relative shadow price of carbon-neutral technology with respect to carbon-neutral capital
is conclusive for carbon-neutral research e®ort feedback rule st in (29).
Minimizing the IBF equation (38) with respect to ¤0 gives the optimal feedback rule
identifying the household's worst-case mean distortion path, ¤¤
0(Mt;Tt) in terms of its












0t 2 [¤0;min;¤0;max] (30)
The optimal feedback rule (30) shows how the household updates its upper boundary of the
range of climate sensitivities in (12) as it observes changes in the CO2 stock and the mean
temperature and [0;¤¤
0t] `stakes out the corners' of the basis used for policymaking. Why
does the worst-case mean distortion path ¤¤
0t(Mt;Tt) depend on atmospheric CO2 concen-
tration rate and mean temperature? The explanation is that ambiguity aversion makes the
household concerned about misreading observed increases in CO2 concentration rate and
temperature as source to global warming and damage impact, respectively. Accordingly,
the household's worst-case beliefs alter to increases in CO2 concentration rate and mean
temperature as though observed increases eventually will cause a greater increase in equi-
librium temperature and damage impact than expected so far. As precaution, robust policy
design becomes more responsive to changes in observed CO2 concentration rate and mean
temperature, and works as an insurance to avoid (if possible) irreversible uncertainty over
high-temperature outcomes up to a degree that corresponds to the household's degree of
ambiguity aversion.
134.1 Ambiguity Aversion and Discounting
From the analytical expression of shadow carbon cost in proposition 1 below we see that
ambiguity aversion has a similar e®ect on carbon cost path as has a low pure rate of time
preference, which makes ambiguity aversion another gadget in the discussion on discounting
that took place in the reviews following the Stern Review e.g. Nordhaus (2006), Dasgupta
(2006), Weitzman (2007) and Sterner and Persson (2008).15
Proposition 1 The expected shadow carbon cost corresponding to the housheold's robust
















































Proof: Solving (38) by guessing-and-verifying and identifying @W=@Mt by determining the
undetermined coe±cient in (57).
Social carbon cost largely depends on geophysical parameters in the climate model (22) -
(24) as well as economic parameters.16 Moreover, ambiguity aversion 1=µ0 2 [0;+1] in-
creases carbon cost, resulting in more stringent policy feedback rules. With no ambiguity
aversion µ0 ! +1, and the e®ect of the quadratic term in (31) cancels and carbon cost
and robust controls collapse to a certainty equivalent optimal control problem, using the
benchmark climate sensitivity as basis in policymaking. In the other extreme, under perfect
ambiguity aversion µ0 ! 0, the household takes into account `uncut' worst-case mean dis-
tortions and expected carbon cost becomes in¯nite. Its consequences are further discussed
in proposition 2 and 3 in section 4.2.
Even though patience ½ and ambiguity aversion 1=µ0 a®ect carbon cost in a similar
manner in (31), ambiguity aversion has an additional e®ect on policy compared to low utility
discounting; it makes worst-case beliefs about equilibrium climate sensitivity responsive to
changes in climate data observations over time as seen in (30) and how this in turn will
a®ect policy depends inter alia on the damage function in (20). In (31) the carbon cost
path is falling over time. The explanation is the way temperature deviation Tt ¡ T0 enters







Normally the increase in scarcity price @W=@Et, as Et falls from a temperature increase,
would increase total damage in (32), however, the reduction in capital Et also reduces total
damage in (32). In the guessed-and-veri¯ed solution to (38) this reduction in total damage
15A discussion on discounting and uncertainty is also found in Guo et al. (2006).
16See appendix A.2. for the list of parameters.
14gets the same rate as the increase in scarcity price, and thus, the two e®ects cancel each










©(Tt ¡ T0) (33)
which is linear in Tt ¡ T0. A non-linear formulation of temperature would call for a value
function with a non-linear term in temperature which, in turn, would result in a shadow
carbon cost being a function of M, T and ~ T, which would also make policy directly respon-
sive to observed changes in carbon concentration rate and temperatures via (31). Imposing
a quadratic temperature term jointly with the nonlinear di®erential equation system for Kt,
AKt, Et and AEt results in demanding calculations and is left out from this article to keep
the illustration of analytical tractability straightforward.
4.2 Ambiguity Aversion and the Dismal Theorem
Proposition 6 in Hennlock (2008b) showed that a policymaker, who expresses perfect am-
biguity aversion, exhibits in¯nite expected carbon cost and resorts to zero carbon-intensive
production as precaution. In this two-sector consumer model, perfect ambiguity aversion
results in a complete shift from carbon-intensive consumption to carbon-neutral consump-
tion.
Proposition 2 Let the household express perfect ambiguity aversion µ0 ! 0. Then its
expected shadow cost of carbon-intensive capital @W=@Kt ! +1, resulting in the robust








Proof: Setting µ0 = 0 in (57) gives limµ0!0 f ! ¡1 and limµ0!0 a ! +1 in (53). Dif-
ferentiating (39) with respect to Kt gives limµ0!0 @W=@Kt ! +1 which in (25) yields (34).
Proposition 2 reminds us about the Dismal Theorem by Weitzman (2008), based on a
static relationship between a utility function and a `climate-sensitivity parameter' with
unknown probability distribution, it demonstrated an in¯nite expected marginal utility at
zero consumption level, if we believe (possibly as a result of ambiguity aversion) in fat-tail-
priors. In my view the dismal theorem, rather than anything else, highlights the importance
of taking ambiguity aversion seriously in climate change policy. Ambiguity aversion pushes
the incentive for taking policy measures today to avoid (if possible) high-impact outcomes
with low but uncertain probability magnitudes. If the household's µ0 ! 0, its beliefs
embrace `Weitzmanian fat-tails' about worst-case mean distortions in climate sensitivity
and its expected shadow carbon cost in (31) becomes in¯nite. An important di®erence here
is that there is (Bayesian) learning in Weitzman (2008) while there is no learning either
in our model or in Hennlock (2008b).17 However, the learning in Weitzman's two-period
17Gollier et al. (2000) focus e.g. on learning and uses prudence to give an interpretation of the precau-
tionary principle.
15model is not realized until we are far away (200 years?) into the future by the arrival of
the second period.18 In our model, the consequence of `Weitzmanian fat-tails' corresponds
to zero initial µ0-beliefs and raises the question what initial level of ambiguity aversion (or
precaution) the household should have today in presence of current scienti¯c uncertainty.
A household can express a high ambiguity aversion but it does not need to be perfect as
will be discussed in the next section.
Even an in¯nite shadow carbon cost do not necessarily imply, as one might think at a
¯rst glance, that robust abatement and investment in technology take upper corners.
Proposition 3 Let the household express perfect ambiguity aversion µ0 ! 0. Then its
























and the robust investment expenditure r¤Y ¤
















t ¸ 0 (36)
Proof: Setting µ0 = 0 in (57) gives limµ0!0 f ! ¡1 and limµ0!0 a ! +1 in (53)
and limµ0!0 b ! +1 in (54). Di®erentiating (39) with respect to Mt, Kt and AKt yield
@W=@Kt ! +1, @W=@Mt ! ¡1 and @W=@AKt ! +1 which in (27) and (28) reproduce
(35) and (36).
Thus despite that both the shadow price of CO2 stock and the shadow price of carbon-












converges to a ¯nite positive value, and consequently, the robust abatement feedback rule
converges to a maximum (but still ¯nite) leverage for given capital paths in (35) also for
`uncut' worst-case mean distortions and an unbounded value function. When it comes to
research e®ort in (36), both @W=@Kt ! +1 and @W=@AKt ! +1 but again the relative
shadow price, conclusive for research e®ort, takes a ¯nite value as seen in (36). The results
in (35) and (36) are speci¯c due to the model formulation of endogenous `relative-shadow-
price-driven' technology growths and that carbon-intensive capital pays for current and
future abatement (polluter-pays-principle).
18Tol et. al. Yohe and Tol (2007) admit the importance of the dismal theorem but also put a label on it:
`Warning: Not to be taken to its logical extreme in application to real world problems.'
164.3 How much Precaution is too Cautious?
Still, proposition 2 and 3, the Dismal Theorem and proposition 6 in Hennlock (2008b) bring
up the question how much precaution is justi¯ed. Weitzman applies the value of statistical
life (VSL) parameter to generate a lower boundary on consumption (Weitzman, 2008). We
may take another approach, considering that a ¯nite upper boundary on ambiguity aversion
1=µ0, when interpreted as precaution, would cut the considered worst-case mean distortion
and leave a minimized ¯nite value of the value function. A possible upper boundary would
be to set µ0 su±ciently high (as an upper boundary for precaution) to make it di±cult to
statistically distinguish alternative worst-case climate sensitivity outcomes from a bench-
mark sensitivity properly set within the IPCC climate sensitivity range. But that brings us
to a normative statement how much aversion to uncertainty should be involved in climate
change policy for it to be consistent with a `precautionary principle' as formulated by e.g.
article 15 of the Rio Declaration? To get a feeling for what µ0 levels we may talk about,
we take some upper boundaries 4:5oC and 6:0oC as mentioned in IPCC (2007a) and derive
corresponding lower boundaries for µ0 by rearranging the optimal feedback rule (30). This
suggests boundaries for µ0 in the interval 1 - 2 percent which in (31) suggests a carbon
cost path that is 3 to 5 times higher than the certainty case, compared to Nordhaus and
Popp (1997) who got up to 4 times the certainty case due to pure risk aversion. Recall
that our result (for simple tractability reason) uses an elasticity of marginal utility of only
´ = 0:5 and linear one-sector damage while Nordhaus and Popp (1997) use ´ = 1 and
non-linear damage, suggesting that ambiguity aversion corresponding to the IPCC range
up to 4:5oC together with a higher ´ and non-linear damage could justify more stringency
than what pure risk aversion has shown in IAMs so far. The e®ect of ambiguity aversion on
carbon cost comes in addition and independently of the e®ect of a low utility discounting
(here 0:03) as the latter increases both the certainty and the uncertainty cost by the same
percentage. As a precursor, table 2 shows derived values for ^ µ0 and robust shadow carbon
cost (as a shadow ambiguity premium) expressed as markups (times the certainty carbon
cost path) for various boundaries of ¤0, here against a benchmark of ^ ¤0 corresponding to
1:5oC.19 The point with a statistical approach would be to calibrate µ0 by calculating over-
all detection error probabilities p(1=µ0) for distinguishing a benchmark climate model from
worst-case climate models by varying 1=µ0.20 Ambiguity aversion then translates to what
detection error probabilities we are willing to accept for distinguishing worst-case climate
models from an approximative benchmark climate model. In the case science should narrow
predictions of climate sensitivity in the future, the corresponding adjustment ^ µ0t over time
replaces learning by updating the range of climate-sensitivity outcomes used as basis for
19The calculations are based on a pure rate of time preference 0:03, elasticity of marginal utility ´ = 0:5,
© = 0:10 and ! = 0:5. Geophysical parameter values are based on calibrations by the author as well as
Smirnov (2005) for a continuous-time version of the climate model in DICE. The parameter values used are
¾v = 1, ¤0 = 3:38, ° = 0:5719, ¸1 = 1:41, 1=¿1 = 0:226, ¿3=¿2 = 0:44 and 1=¿2 = 0:02 and ­ = 0:0083.
20Hansen and Sargent (2001) suggest that a robustness parameter µ should be set su±ciently high for
it to take long time series to distinguish the benchmark model from worst-case models. By calculating
likelihood ratio under benchmark and worst-case models Hansen and Sargent (2008) suggest calculating
overall detection error probability using detection error probabilities conditional on each model, respectively.
For 1=µ0 = 0 models are identical and p = 0:5. In general the greater is 1=µ0, the lower is then p.
17Range (oC) ^ µ0 Shadow Ambiguity Premium
1.5 - 1.5 +1 1
1.5 - 3.0 0.039 2.31
1.5 - 4.5 0.019 3.62
1.5 - 6.0 0.013 4.93
1.5 - 7.0 0.011 5.81
1.5 - 8.0 0.009 6.68
1.5 - 9.0 0.0078 7.56
1.5 - 10.0 0.0068 8.43
1.5 - 20.0 0.0031 17.17
Table 2: Derivation of initial ^ µ0 and Shadow Ambiguity Premium
robust policy design. Precaution then becomes a function of waiting time for enough data
to discriminate worst-case climate models from approximative benchmark climate models.
4.4 Tractability vs Complexity in Analytical IAM
A technical feature of our IAM is analytically tractable dynamic programming solutions
in continuous time instead of computer-based numerical simulations in discrete time as
usual seen in IAM. Analytically tractable solutions to non-linear di®erential games, using
guessing-and-verifying methods in dynamic programming, are usually extremely di±cult
to identify. Still an analytical solution usually has better reliability, allows for deeper
understandings as trajectories can be traced down to their explicit functional forms, and
the model can also serve as a basis for which more complex extensions gradually can be
added. To obtain a unique analytically tractable solution some major simpli¯cations have
been made e.g. (i) speci¯cations have been carefully chosen for 6 of the 32 parameters
(see appendix A.2.) that amongst other things make the objective function additively
separable while remaining 26 parameters are free to be varied for sensitivity analysis and
simulations, (ii) linear damage only in the non-carbon-generating sector (two-sector damage
results in multiple and not straightforward analytically tractable solutions),21 (iii) Knightian
uncertainty only in the radiative forcing parameter, and (iv) a slightly modi¯ed temperature
equation to make it follow an Ito process, but still it can be calibrated to follow the original
temperature equation used in DICE closely.
5 Summary
Imperfect measurement of uncertainty in climate modeling and climate impact damage
suggest that the traditional concepts of subjective expected utility theory and risk aversion
may be insu±cient in explaining and capturing reasonings behind precautionary principles
in climate policy. We applied the robust control IAM approach in Hennlock (2008b) which
21M. Hennlock, A Robust Abatement Policy in a Climate Change Policy Model, Department of Economic
and Statistics, University of Gothenburg, 2006, unpublished draft.
18di®ers from existing `risk analysis' in IAMs in that it does not ¯x one or another model
builder's sometimes ad hoc (subjective) probability distributions to uncertain parameters.
Statistically it mimics a decision-making process in which ¯nite climate data from under-
lying physical processes is statistically insu±cient to predict climate sensitivity probability
distributions with certainty (IPCC, 2007a). We applied the approach to a two-sectoral ex-
tension of DICE - with a carbon-intensive and a carbon-neutral sector and a representative
household that expresses ambiguity aversion and therefore uses robust control to identify
robust policy feedback rules. Robust control is a condition of analysis when speci¯cations
of the dynamics, in our case climate modeling and climate impacts, are open to doubt by
the decision-maker due to imperfect measurement of uncertainty. We found the following
results:
1. Ambiguity aversion puts forward an incentive to take action via a `shadow ambi-
guity premium' on social carbon cost, inducing a robust policy feedback design
that avoids (if possible) a realization of high-impact low-probability outcomes.
2. As an upper boundary for precautionary beliefs, we proposed the statistical ap-
proach, that µ0 is set su±ciently high to make it statistically di±cult to distin-
guish worst-case models from benchmark models using detection error probabil-
ities.
3. Ambiguity aversion in combination with linear damage, increases shadow carbon
cost in a similar way as a low pure rate of time preference.
4. Ambiguity aversion in combination with non-linear damage would, besides even
greater stringency, make policy feedback rules responsive to changes in climate
data observations as it makes the household concerned about misreading in-
creases in observed CO2 concentration rate or temperature as sources to global
warming and impact. This behavior cannot be calibrated by a low pure rate of
time preference.
5. Perfect ambiguity aversion results in an in¯nite expected shadow carbon cost and
zero carbon-intensive consumption. Still, the relative shadow price converges to a
¯nite value and the robust abatement feedback rule is ¯nite despite an unbounded
value function.
6. Dynamic programming has identi¯ed an analytically tractable solution to this
IAM.
There are several interesting ways to extend robust control in climate change policy analysis.
Thinking about Roe and Baker (2007), who stated that it is not likely that scienti¯c progress
or learning will narrow the thicker high-temperature tail, strengthens the argument for a
robust policy design as a complement to (Bayesian) learning and traditional `risk analysis'
in IAMs.22 An interesting extension should be to combine ambiguity aversion and learning
22Roe and Baker (2007) do not therefore expect the range presented in the next IPCC report to be di®erent
from that in the 2007 report, `we are constrained by the inevitable: the more likely a large warming is for a
given forcing (i.e. the greater the positive feedbacks) the greater the uncertainty will be in the magnitude of
that warming.'
19under imperfect measurement of uncertainty and balance bene¯ts of insuring against irre-
versible deeper uncertainty by action to bene¯ts of awaiting better scienti¯c information
by delaying action, as has already been done within risk analysis (see e.g. Gollier et al.,
2000). A scienti¯c-oriented extension is to develop and adapt statistical methods based
on detection error probabilities for discriminating worst-case models from approximative
benchmark models within IPPC ranges, as well as to simulate and calibrate this IAM for
reasonable empirical parameter values. Other extensions are; non-linear damage which to-
gether with ambiguity aversion would make policy responsive to climate data observations
as discussed in section 4.1, to extend to a game with multiple regional representative house-
holds involved in cap-and-trade as well as to repeat the dynamic maximin decision criterion
to include several uncertain model parameters also in e.g. climate impact damage.23
Appendix
A.1. The Dynamic Programming Problem
The section presents a solution structure to AMUICE-C with a parameter-setting that
allows for an analytically tractable solution to the zero-sum di®erential game de¯ned by
objective (17) and dynamic system (18) - (24). Forming the Isaacs-Bellman-Fleming (IBF)
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(Tt ¡ ~ Tt)
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The robust control vector ¡¤
t = (Ct;Gt;qt;rt;st) is given by maximizing the partial di®er-
ential equation (38) with respect to policy variables and minimizing with respect to ¤0t and
solving for feedback rules.
23M. Hennlock, A Robust Abatement Policy in a Climate Change Policy Model, Department of Economic
and Statistics, University of Gothenburg, 2006, unpublished draft.
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¶
e¡½t (39)
satisfy the di®erential equation system formed by (38).
Proof: Substituting (25) to (30) into (38) and collecting terms forms the indirect Isaacs-
Bellman-Fleming equation. Guessing the value function (39), taking FOC and rearranging
give the optimal feedback rules. An analytically tractable solution is possible by setting
¾ = 2 and ´ = ¿ = ® = Á = Ã = 1=2 while the remaining 26 parameters, listed in appendix
A.2., can be set free. The carbon-intensive consumption feedback rule is
C¤(Kt) =
4(1 ¡ !)2
a2 Kt ¸ 0 (40)
where a is de¯ned in (53). The carbon-neutral consumption feedback rule is
G¤(Et) =
4!2
(¼d)2Et ¸ 0 (41)








t ¸ 0 (42)














































































































Solving the equation system (46) - (52) for undetermined coe±cients gives the coe±cients






































































The coe±cients in (53) - (59) are uniquely de¯ned, the coe±cient k in proposition 4 is
uniquely determined by (53) - (59), and hence, the feedback rules (40) to (45) correspond-
ing to the guessed value function (39) are unique and the solution is veri¯ed. Q.E.D.
A.1.1. Transitional Dynamics
To ¯nd the optimal trajectories in the dynamic system, the feedback rules (40) to (45) are
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dt (66)















































































































Tt ¡ ~ Tt
´
dt (76)
Besides computer-based methods an analytical solution to (70) - (76) can be found by using
transformations ^ K ´ K1=2, ^ AK ´ A
1=2
K , ^ E ´ E1=2 and ^ AE ´ A
1=2
E transforming the system
to a linear system.
A.1.2. Steady States
From (60) to (66) the steady states ( ¹ K; ¹ AK; ¹ E; ¹ AE; ¹ M; ¹ T; ¹ ~ T) as t ! 1 in the 4N + 3 state






















































¹ ~ T = ¹ T (79)
The corresponding steady state policy variables as t ! 1 are found by substituting (77) -
(79) in (40) - (44).
A.2. List of Parameters
The found analytically tractable solution required 6 of 32 parameters to be speci¯ed as
below. The remaining 26 parameters below are free to be varied.
Free Parameters
½ > 0 pure time preference
! 2 [0;1] share parameter in objective function
1=µ0 2 [0;+1] degree of ambiguity aversion
c ¸ 0 abatement cost parameter
£ climate impact parameter
¼ ¸ 0 relative price carbon-neutral input good
º ¸ 0 carbon-intensive research sector e±ciency parameter
¯ ¸ 0 carbon-neutral research sector e±ciency parameter
± ¸ 0 depreciation rate carbon-intensive capital
1=· ¸ 0 depreciation rate carbon-neutral capital
±K ¸ 0 depreciation rate carbon-intensive technology
±A ¸ 0 depreciation rate carbon-neutral technology
' ¸ 0 carbon-intensity
¹ ¸ 0 abatement e®ort e±ciency
ÀK ¸ 0 Malthusian constraint carbon-intensive sector
ÀE ¸ 0 Malthusian constraint carbon-neutral sector
Free Parameters in the Climate Model
^ ¸0 ¸ 0 radiative forcing parameter
^ ¸1 ¸ 0 climate feedback parameter
¿1 ¸ 0 thermal capacity of atmospheric layer
¿3 ¸ 0 thermal capacity of deep ocean layer
1=¿2 ¸ 0 transfer rate from the upper layer to the deeper ocean layer
1=­ ¸ 0 transfer rate of CO2 from atmosphere to other reservoirs
² ¸ 0 marginal atmospheric retention ratio
M0 ¸ 0 initial CO2 concentration rate
T0 ¸ 0 initial atmospheric mean temperature
~ T0 ¸ 0 initial deep ocean mean temperature
25Speci¯ed Parameters in the Analytically Tractable Solution
¾ = 2 elasticity of substitution
´ = 0:5 elasticity of marginal utility of ¯nal good
® = 0:5 capital intensity carbon-intensive production
Á = 0:5 capital intensity carbon-neutral production
¿ = 0:5 Malthusian exponent constraint carbon-intensive sector
Ã = 0:5 Malthusian exponent constraint carbon-neutral sector
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